| Chapter Seven --
Concluding Comment
Theodore Roosevelt, more than any other president, recognized the dangers
to democracy inherent in allowing major corporations to amass unbridled
economic and political power. From his bully pulpit in the White House,
Roosevelt railed against the “robber barons” of the day and, in relying
on his Justice Department to break mammoth and seemingly all-powerful companies
into smaller pieces, achieved fame as a “trustbuster.” The titans of American
industry were not pleased. “We bought the son of a bitch,” steel magnate
Henry Frick once complained, “and then he did not stay bought.”
In 1910, after his second term in the White House, Teddy Roosevelt picked
up where his trust-busting crusade had stopped. “We must drive the special
interests out of politics,” he declared. “The citizens of the United States
must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they have themselves
called into being. There can be no effective control of corporations while
their political activity remains. To put an end to it will neither be a
short not an easy task, but it can be done. . . .”
Nearly a century later, however, Roosevelt’s warning still has an eerie
ring of urgency. Even today, the American political system is awash in
a tidal wave of corporate money, special interests manipulate the machinery
of government to their own ends, and some who call themselves public servants
eagerly do the bidding of those who do not have the best interests of their
constituents in mind. The tobacco industry — whose power was finally constrained
by the legal system, not the political system — provides the starkest and
sorriest example of what’s wrong. Even after the industry had lost virtually
all its public credibility, its legions of lawyers and lobbyists could
still find plenty of compliant collaborators in Congress as well as in
statehouses from coast to coast. Why? Over the years, Big Tobacco spent
big — untold millions of dollars in political contributions, gifts, and
other forms of largesse — to keep lawmakers in Washington and in state
legislatures right where it wanted them: in its pocket.
Nonetheless, most Americans undoubtedly would be shocked to learn that
many of the state laws under which they live and work have actually been
written by major U.S. corporations – not by the state legislators they
have elected to represent them. As this report documents, this approach
to lawmaking at the state level has been championed and carried out over
the years by the American Legislative Exchange Council. Through ALEC, corporations
pay to have their special-interest legislation promoted to state legislators
across the country.
It is perfectly clear that ALEC’s “member legislators” do not set the
agenda for the organization. Corporate representatives are also considered
members and are welcomed to the table as “equals.” But that is just the
beginning. Based on their financial contributions, corporate members can
take the lead in proposing legislation to be considered by the various
industry committees and can then sit on those committees and have the power
to veto any proposed “model” bill that does not meet their specifications.
ALEC’s approach, carefully constructed to assure corporate control,
is “pay to play.” Corporations have of course proven only too willing to
“pay” in order to “play” in the crafting of state laws.
It is time to shine the spotlight on ALEC, its sponsors, and its members,
and on ALEC’s use of corporate money to buy access to America’s state legislatures.
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